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Introduction	  More	  than	  a	  decade	  ago,	  the	  cognitive	  scientist	  Steven	  Pinker	  published	  The	  blank	  slate,	  a	  book	  that	  weighed	  in	  on	  the	  centuries-­‐old	  debate	  about	  the	  contributions	  of	  nature	  and	  nurture	  to	  human	  psychological	  characteristics	  (Pinker,	  2002).	  When	  the	  eminent	  British	  biologist	  Sir	  Patrick	  Bateson	  needed	  a	  title	  for	  his	  review	  of	  the	  book	  in	  Science,	  he	  chose	  to	  call	  it	  “The	  corpse	  of	  a	  wearisome	  debate,”	  because	  by	  2002,	  Bateson	  already	  considered	  this	  debate	  to	  be	  “tedious	  and	  increasingly	  irrelevant”	  (Bateson,	  2002,	  p.	  2212).	  But	  the	  public’s	  reaction	  was	  different:	  Pinker’s	  book	  was	  a	  bestseller	  that	  was	  ultimately	  a	  finalist	  for	  the	  Pulitzer	  Prize.	  Today,	  published	  studies	  continue	  to	  compare	  the	  contributions	  of	  genes	  and	  environments	  to	  complex	  human	  traits	  (Plomin	  &	  Deary,	  2015;	  Polderman	  et	  al.,	  2015)	  even	  as	  numerous	  theorists	  insist	  that	  such	  comparisons	  are	  pointless	  and	  that	  the	  Nature-­‐Nurture	  debate	  should	  be	  considered	  passé	  (Blumberg,	  2005;	  Gottlieb,	  1997;	  Moore,	  2002,	  2013b;	  Weaver,	  2007).	  So	  the	  question	  is,	  why	  do	  some	  people	  continue	  to	  think	  the	  Nature-­‐Nurture	  debate	  is	  still	  worthy	  of	  attention?	  	  Into	  this	  morass	  wades	  James	  Tabery,	  an	  associate	  professor	  of	  philosophy	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Utah,	  whose	  admirable	  new	  book,	  Beyond	  versus:	  The	  struggle	  to	  understand	  
the	  interaction	  of	  nature	  and	  nurture,	  explains	  the	  persistence	  of	  this	  debate	  by	  pointing	  out	  how	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  disputants	  in	  the	  Nature-­‐Nurture	  debate	  have	  been	  talking	  past	  one	  another	  for	  more	  than	  100	  years.	  As	  Tabery	  sees	  it,	  by	  failing	  to	  agree	  on	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  the	  phrase	  “interaction	  between	  nature	  and	  nurture,”	  the	  disputants	  have	  found	  themselves	  separated	  by	  an	  “explanatory	  divide,”	  whereby	  they	  disagree	  about	  what	  sorts	  of	  natural	  phenomena	  need	  to	  be	  explained,	  what	  qualifies	  as	  suitable	  explanations	  for	  those	  phenomena,	  and	  how	  one	  should	  go	  about	  studying	  them	  (among	  other	  disagreements).	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  one	  group	  claims	  that	  nature	  and	  nurture	  interact	  to	  produce	  a	  particular	  trait—a	  phenotype—the	  other	  group	  remains	  unconvinced,	  so	  the	  debate	  continues,	  even	  as	  more	  and	  more	  empirical	  data	  pile	  up,	  data	  that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  thought	  sufficient	  to	  end	  the	  debate.	  So,	  Tabery’s	  book	  is	  fundamentally	  about	  
how	  different	  theorists	  in	  the	  past	  150	  years	  have	  worked	  with	  different	  concepts	  of	  interaction.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  make	  real	  progress	  on	  this	  front,	  Tabery	  endeavors	  to	  construct	  an	  “explanatory	  bridge”	  that	  could	  help	  researchers	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  explanatory	  divide	  understand	  how	  their	  work	  relates	  to	  the	  work	  of	  those	  laboring	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  	  Tabery’s	  book	  is	  a	  valuable	  contribution	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  gene-­‐environment	  interaction,	  because	  he	  is	  certainly	  right	  that	  one	  reason	  for	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  Nature-­‐Nurture	  debate	  is	  the	  different	  approaches	  adopted	  by	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  disputants.	  Tabery	  calls	  these	  approaches	  the	  “variation-­‐partitioning”	  and	  the	  “mechanism-­‐elucidation”	  approaches	  respectively.	  The	  former	  approach	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  population	  genetics,	  and	  has	  traditionally	  been	  used	  to	  evaluate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  genetic	  variation	  is	  associated	  with	  phenotypic	  variation	  (hence	  “variation-­‐partitioning”);	  historically,	  behavior	  geneticists	  have	  used	  correlational	  studies	  of	  identical	  and	  fraternal	  twins	  to	  answer	  these	  kinds	  of	  questions.	  The	  latter	  approach	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  developmental	  biology,	  and	  has	  traditionally	  been	  used	  by	  experimental	  biologists	  and	  psychologists	  to	  discover	  how	  physical	  entities	  in	  the	  body	  (i.e.,	  DNA,	  proteins,	  etc.)	  interact	  in	  mechanistic	  ways	  with	  physical	  entities	  in	  their	  environments	  (i.e.,	  nutrients,	  sunlight,	  hormones,	  etc.)	  to	  build	  phenotypes	  (hence	  “mechanism-­‐elucidation”);	  historically,	  these	  researchers	  have	  used	  experimental	  studies	  of	  non-­‐human	  organisms	  to	  answer	  these	  kinds	  of	  questions.	  Because	  these	  two	  groups	  have	  different	  ideas	  about	  what	  it	  means	  for	  nature	  and	  nurture	  to	  interact,	  they	  have	  been	  failing	  to	  see	  eye-­‐to-­‐eye	  since	  scientific	  efforts	  to	  address	  the	  Nature-­‐Nurture	  question	  first	  began	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  Thus,	  Tabery’s	  effort	  to	  build	  a	  bridge	  between	  these	  camps	  is	  a	  worthwhile	  enterprise.	  	  Tabery’s	  book	  is	  very	  well	  written,	  helpful,	  clearly	  articulated	  (despite	  the	  conceptually	  complex	  subject	  matter),	  acutely	  reasoned,	  and	  thought	  provoking;	  it	  is	  an	  exceptionally	  valuable	  contribution	  to	  thinking	  about	  the	  interaction	  of	  nature	  and	  nurture.	  The	  book	  reads	  as	  good	  philosophy	  that	  has	  been	  written	  for	  an	  audience	  that	  might—and	  in	  fact,	  
should—include	  non-­‐philosophers.	  	  	  
Structure	  of	  the	  book	  After	  an	  introduction,	  Tabery	  begins	  with	  three	  chapters	  that	  present	  a	  history	  of	  debates	  about	  Nature-­‐Nurture	  interaction.	  These	  chapters	  focus	  on	  (1)	  a	  debate	  about	  eugenics	  between	  Ronald	  A.	  Fisher	  and	  Lancelot	  Hogben	  in	  the	  1930s,	  (2)	  a	  debate	  about	  IQ	  between	  Arthur	  Jensen	  and	  Richard	  Lewontin	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  and	  (3)	  a	  debate	  about	  characteristics	  like	  depression	  and	  antisocial	  behavior	  between	  a	  research	  team	  led	  by	  Avshalom	  Caspi	  and	  Terrie	  Moffitt	  and	  a	  number	  of	  their	  critics	  in	  the	  2000s.	  Tabery’s	  use	  of	  debates	  between	  individuals	  personalizes	  these	  debates	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  for	  interesting	  reading;	  tracing	  the	  Nature-­‐Nurture	  debate	  across	  the	  decades	  by	  focusing	  on	  raging	  disputes	  between	  individuals	  works	  well	  as	  a	  narrative	  device,	  so	  Tabery	  has	  wound	  up	  with	  an	  engaging	  chronicle.	  The	  approach	  also	  allows	  for	  a	  clear-­‐sighted	  analysis;	  using	  Tabery’s	  sources,	  one	  can	  see	  how	  the	  debate	  has	  persisted	  because	  of	  the	  way	  the	  two	  parties	  have	  talked	  past	  one	  another.	  And	  by	  treating	  the	  debate	  as	  he	  does,	  Tabery	  has	  written	  a	  balanced,	  non-­‐polemical	  treatise.	  	  Of	  particular	  importance	  is	  the	  way	  he	  dismisses	  the	  long-­‐running	  distraction	  wherein	  the	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  accuse	  each	  other	  of	  being	  either	  ignorant	  or	  motivated	  primarily	  by	  political	  concerns.	  He	  is	  clearly	  
right	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  the	  debate’s	  resilience	  than	  this.	  His	  strategy	  of	  tracking	  the	  controversy	  across	  historical	  periods	  allows	  him	  to	  weaken	  (if	  not	  outright	  dismiss)	  claims	  of	  sociopolitical	  bias.	  	  In	  part	  II	  of	  his	  book,	  Tabery	  leaves	  behind	  the	  tools	  of	  the	  historian	  and	  takes	  up	  the	  tools	  of	  the	  philosopher	  of	  science,	  helping	  to	  clarify	  the	  relationship	  between	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  and	  variation-­‐partitioning.	  This	  is	  the	  most	  important	  and	  valuable	  part	  of	  the	  book,	  and	  although	  I	  will	  take	  issue	  with	  some	  of	  Tabery’s	  points	  below,	  I	  cannot	  find	  any	  outright	  errors	  in	  his	  work.	  In	  this	  part	  of	  the	  book,	  he	  does	  a	  superb	  job	  of	  characterizing	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  variation-­‐partitioning	  and	  the	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approaches,	  and	  in	  particular,	  of	  clarifying	  what,	  exactly,	  the	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approach	  can	  contribute	  to	  understanding;	  his	  efforts	  here	  represent	  a	  significant	  achievement.	  In	  particular,	  he	  illustrates	  how	  C.	  Kenneth	  Waters’	  (2007)	  concept	  of	  an	  “actual	  difference	  maker”	  can	  be	  used	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  exactly	  it	  is	  that	  the	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approach	  does	  (i.e.,	  this	  approach	  is	  effectively	  a	  search	  for	  actual	  difference	  makers,	  factors	  whose	  variation	  accounts	  for	  phenotypic	  variation	  in	  a	  population).	  By	  combining	  this	  concept	  with	  ideas	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mechanisms,	  Tabery	  has	  been	  able	  to	  describe	  “population	  thinking	  about	  mechanisms,”	  which,	  he	  argues,	  bridges	  the	  work	  of	  variation-­‐partitioners	  and	  mechanism-­‐elucidators.	  	  Tabery’s	  final	  two	  chapters	  constitute	  a	  part	  III	  that	  concerns	  itself	  more	  with	  the	  future	  than	  with	  the	  past	  or	  present,	  and	  specifically	  with	  the	  bioethical	  implications	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  phenotypes	  that	  develop	  via	  gene-­‐environment	  interactions.	  His	  decision	  to	  include	  this	  part	  in	  his	  book	  was	  a	  good	  one;	  these	  are	  important	  ideas	  to	  understand,	  particularly	  given	  how	  they	  might	  be	  used	  by	  states	  to	  monitor	  and	  intervene	  on	  innocent	  individuals	  or	  by	  couples	  to	  make	  pre-­‐implantation	  decisions	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  in	  vitro	  fertilization.	  Tabery’s	  work	  is	  particularly	  strong	  where	  he	  clarifies	  how	  the	  results	  of	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt’s	  work	  do	  not	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  people	  with,	  for	  example,	  low	  levels	  of	  the	  MAOA	  protein	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  antisocial	  behavior;	  it	  all	  depends	  on	  both	  their	  genes	  and	  their	  developmental	  environments.	  	  
Variation-­‐partitioning	  versus	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  At	  the	  center	  of	  this	  book	  is	  the	  distinction	  Tabery	  makes	  between	  the	  variation-­‐partitioning	  and	  the	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approaches	  to	  explaining	  phenotypes.	  The	  former	  approach	  allows	  one	  to	  conclude	  that,	  for	  instance,	  genetic	  variation	  in	  a	  population	  can	  account	  for	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  height	  in	  that	  population;	  this	  kind	  of	  conclusion	  can	  be	  generated	  with	  correlational	  studies	  that	  do	  not	  require	  any	  experimental	  manipulations.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  latter	  approach	  requires	  experimental	  studies	  that	  seek	  to	  establish	  how	  an	  individual	  comes	  to	  have	  his	  or	  her	  body-­‐length.	  Adopting	  an	  understandable	  pluralism,	  Tabery	  sees	  value	  in	  both	  approaches.	  In	  fact,	  he	  believes	  they	  co-­‐inform	  one	  another.	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  correlational	  studies	  can	  be	  used	  to	  generate	  hypotheses	  about	  which	  variables	  might	  play	  causal	  roles	  in	  the	  development	  of	  particular	  phenotypes,	  and	  that	  these	  hypotheses	  can	  then	  be	  used	  by	  experimentalists	  to	  elucidate	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  those	  phenotypes.	  Likewise,	  once	  mechanisms	  have	  been	  elucidated	  that	  explain	  how	  particular	  phenotypes	  arise	  in	  development,	  this	  understanding	  can	  be	  used	  to	  predict	  phenotypic	  variation	  in	  a	  population.	  
	  Tabery	  is	  right.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  that	  variation-­‐partitioning	  and	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approaches	  must	  be	  considered	  exclusive	  enterprises;	  they	  can	  co-­‐inform	  one	  another.	  Used	  properly—that	  is,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approaches—variation-­‐partitioning	  approaches	  can	  add	  value	  to	  scientific	  endeavors.	  I	  do	  not	  grant	  these	  points	  lightly,	  because	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade,	  I	  have	  been	  an	  outspoken	  critic	  of	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approaches	  to	  causal	  explanation	  (Moore,	  2002,	  2006,	  2013a).	  Of	  course,	  I	  stand	  by	  my	  claim	  that	  behavior	  geneticists	  have	  historically	  not	  used	  their	  approach	  in	  conjunction	  with	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approaches,	  and	  that	  instead	  they	  have	  typically	  black-­‐boxed	  development,	  an	  approach	  that	  is	  of	  limited	  value.	  But	  these	  concerns	  notwithstanding,	  Tabery	  has	  made	  a	  strong	  case	  that	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approaches	  are	  a	  tool	  that	  can	  be	  of	  use	  to	  scientists,	  specifically	  in	  steering	  the	  attention	  of	  mechanism-­‐elucidators	  to	  hypotheses	  that	  might	  be	  worth	  exploring.	  	  Nonetheless,	  I	  still	  believe	  that	  the	  tools	  on	  either	  side	  of	  Tabery’s	  explanatory	  bridge	  are	  not	  of	  equal	  value,	  even	  if	  Tabery	  might	  see	  them	  that	  way.	  For	  example,	  of	  the	  variation-­‐partitioners,	  Tabery	  writes	  that	  they	  are	  “certainly	  allowed	  to	  stay	  on	  their	  side	  and	  ignore	  the	  causal	  mechanisms…”	  (p.	  146).	  But	  the	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approach—because	  it	  cannot	  by	  itself	  contribute	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  causal	  mechanisms—will	  always	  yield	  only	  a	  partial	  story	  about	  why	  things	  are	  as	  they	  are,	  a	  story	  that	  cannot	  offer	  any	  practical	  information	  about	  how	  to	  influence	  the	  development	  of	  children,	  crops,	  or	  livestock	  in	  beneficial	  ways;	  at	  best,	  these	  approaches	  allow	  for	  prediction	  at	  better-­‐than-­‐chance	  rates.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  world	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  bridge	  is	  more	  self-­‐contained;	  by	  itself,	  the	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approach	  can	  identify	  tools	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  intervene	  in	  development	  in	  beneficial	  ways	  and	  can	  identify	  actual	  difference	  makers	  that	  can	  help	  explain	  variation	  across	  a	  population.	  This	  is	  true	  because	  if	  you	  understand	  a	  causal	  mechanism,	  you	  can	  both	  explain	  variation	  in	  a	  population	  and	  potentially	  alter	  it.	  There	  is	  no	  particular	  reason	  why	  a	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approach	  is	  required	  as	  a	  first	  step	  to	  identify	  an	  actual	  difference	  maker,	  so	  mechanism-­‐elucidators	  really	  can	  stay	  on	  their	  side	  of	  the	  bridge,	  confident	  that	  their	  work	  will	  yield	  information	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  improve	  the	  human	  condition.	  To	  refer	  to	  work	  cited	  by	  Tabery,	  even	  if	  a	  variation-­‐partitioning	  study	  like	  that	  conducted	  by	  Hariri	  and	  colleagues	  (2003)	  had	  been	  unable	  to	  find	  any	  naturally-­‐occurring	  variation	  in	  memory	  performance	  in	  human	  populations,	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  studies	  like	  those	  conducted	  by	  Mizuno	  and	  colleagues	  (2000)	  would	  still	  have	  identified	  how	  the	  system	  being	  studied	  works,	  and	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  improve	  memory	  performance.	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  work	  of	  mechanism-­‐elucidators	  is	  of	  more	  value	  than	  the	  work	  of	  variation-­‐partitioners.	  	  	  Tabery	  and	  I	  agree	  that	  human	  behavior	  geneticists	  have	  historically	  black-­‐boxed	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  responsible	  for	  phenotypes.	  But	  we	  also	  agree	  that	  history	  need	  not	  dictate	  the	  future;	  if	  advocates	  of	  variation-­‐partitioning	  begin	  “crossing	  the	  bridge”	  to	  consider	  questions	  of	  mechanism,	  by	  all	  means,	  advocates	  of	  the	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approach	  should	  welcome	  them.	  I	  certainly	  do!	  Nonetheless,	  I	  continue	  to	  harbor	  concerns	  about	  the	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approach	  as	  it	  is	  practiced	  by	  contemporary	  researchers,	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  reasons.	  	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  comprehensive	  understanding	  that	  Tabery	  both	  possesses	  himself	  and	  has	  tried	  to	  disseminate	  in	  his	  book,	  the	  results	  of	  variation-­‐partitioning	  studies	  can	  very	  easily—and	  erroneously!—be	  taken	  as	  having	  revealed	  more	  than	  they	  have	  actually	  revealed.	  For	  example,	  imagine	  a	  researcher	  who	  studies	  how	  variation	  in	  parental	  socioeconomic	  status	  (SES)	  is	  related	  to	  variation	  in	  IQ.	  If,	  in	  this	  imaginary	  study,	  the	  researcher	  finds	  that	  she	  can	  account	  for	  all	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  IQ	  by	  looking	  at	  variations	  in	  parental	  SES,	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  conclude	  that	  IQ	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  other	  variables.	  But	  this	  would	  be	  a	  mistake,	  because	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approaches	  cannot	  reveal	  the	  effects	  of	  factors	  that	  do	  not	  vary,	  even	  if	  those	  factors	  play	  important	  causal	  roles	  
in	  phenotype	  development.	  So	  for	  example,	  in	  a	  population	  where	  everyone	  is	  exposed	  to	  the	  same	  diet,	  nutritional	  factors	  will	  not	  look	  like	  they	  influence	  IQ,	  even	  if	  they	  do.	  This	  is	  a	  problem,	  because	  the	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approach	  allows	  us	  to	  easily	  miss	  ways	  of	  influencing	  an	  outcome,	  ways	  that	  would	  involve	  intervening	  on	  variables	  that	  are	  either	  relatively	  stable	  in	  a	  population	  or	  that	  have	  simply	  not	  drawn	  a	  researcher’s	  attention.	  Of	  course,	  if	  some	  of	  these	  variables	  are	  easy	  to	  manipulate,	  failing	  to	  see	  their	  mechanistic	  roles	  could	  represent	  a	  fairly	  serious	  missed	  opportunity.	  	  This	  problem	  could	  be	  in	  evidence	  whenever	  a	  variation-­‐partitioning	  study	  fails	  to	  find	  that	  variation	  in	  a	  factor	  accounts	  for	  much	  of	  the	  phenotypic	  variation	  in	  a	  population.	  In	  one	  section	  of	  his	  book,	  Tabery	  writes	  about	  how	  twin	  and	  adoption	  studies	  conducted	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  implicated	  a	  genetic	  component	  in	  depression.	  This	  result	  should	  not	  have	  surprised	  anyone,	  because	  depression—like	  any	  psychological	  condition—is	  manifested	  in	  the	  brain	  and	  body,	  entities	  that	  are	  built	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  genome.	  But	  consider	  for	  a	  moment	  what	  it	  would	  have	  meant	  if	  the	  behavior	  geneticists	  had	  found	  that	  variation	  in	  depression	  could	  not	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  variation	  in	  genetic	  factors.	  Obviously,	  such	  a	  finding	  would	  mean	  that	  all	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  depression	  in	  the	  studied	  population	  could	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  variation	  in	  non-­‐genetic	  factors,	  such	  as	  exposure	  to	  divorce,	  death	  of	  a	  spouse,	  or	  the	  onset	  of	  a	  serious	  physical	  illness.	  But,	  would	  such	  a	  finding	  have	  meant	  that	  depression	  could	  occur	  in	  a	  person	  without	  any	  help	  from	  the	  person’s	  genome?	  Of	  course	  not!	  For	  depression	  to	  manifest	  in	  a	  brain,	  engagement	  of	  the	  genome	  will	  be	  required.	  As	  any	  molecular	  biologist	  would	  affirm,	  all	  phenotypes—depression	  included—arise	  from	  interactions	  between	  genetic	  and	  non-­‐genetic	  factors.	  So	  if	  the	  genome	  is	  not	  implicated	  in	  a	  behavior	  genetic	  study,	  that	  simply	  means	  that	  there’s	  little	  to	  no	  variation	  in	  the	  population	  in	  the	  genetic	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  studied	  phenotype;	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  are	  no	  genetic	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  that	  phenotype.	  	  Much	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  genes	  cannot	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  genetic	  factors	  are	  unimportant	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  phenotype,	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  interaction	  in	  a	  variation-­‐partitioning	  study	  is	  equally	  hard	  to	  interpret.	  Ultimately,	  this	  reflects	  an	  important	  asymmetry	  in	  how	  the	  results	  of	  analyses	  of	  variance	  (ANOVA)	  should	  be	  understood.	  While	  statistically	  significant	  main	  effects	  or	  interactions	  are	  meaningful,	  
failures	  to	  find	  such	  effects	  are	  not	  necessarily	  meaningful,	  for	  the	  usual	  reasons	  that	  null	  results	  cannot	  be	  clearly	  interpreted.	  Particularly	  when	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  what	  the	  relevant	  genetic	  and	  nongenetic	  factors	  are	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  phenotype—which	  is	  the	  case	  for	  virtually	  all	  complex	  phenotypes,	  at	  present—it	  is	  impossible	  to	  be	  sure	  if	  a	  
variation-­‐partitioning	  project	  is	  studying	  the	  proper	  factors.	  For	  example,	  Tabery	  describes	  how	  Turkheimer	  found	  gene	  ×	  environment	  interactions	  contributing	  to	  IQ	  only	  after	  decades	  of	  earlier	  studies	  had	  failed	  to	  find	  such	  interactions.	  (We	  should	  not	  be	  surprised	  that	  an	  appropriately	  broad	  population—in	  this	  case,	  one	  that	  included	  poor	  children—revealed	  interactions,	  because	  only	  populations	  characterized	  by	  sufficiently	  variable	  environments	  would	  be	  able	  to	  reveal	  the	  effect.)	  This	  is	  a	  case	  study	  in	  why	  we	  should	  recognize	  “no	  interaction”	  as	  a	  null	  result,	  one	  that	  carries	  with	  it	  all	  of	  the	  usual	  problems	  of	  interpretation.	  The	  failure	  to	  find	  a	  statistically	  significant	  interaction	  between	  two	  variables	  ought	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  that	  these	  two	  variables	  are	  not	  interacting;	  other	  ways	  of	  conducting	  the	  study	  could	  very	  well	  reveal	  an	  interaction	  that	  was	  there	  all	  along.	  	  Despite	  the	  strengths	  of	  his	  argument,	  I	  believe	  Tabery	  has	  not	  adequately	  considered	  this	  asymmetry.	  For	  example,	  after	  asking	  “should	  we	  assume	  depression	  arises	  from	  this	  case	  of	  gene-­‐environment	  interaction,	  or	  should	  we	  assume	  depression	  does	  not	  arise	  from	  this	  case	  of	  interaction?”,	  Tabery	  answers:	  “we	  shouldn’t	  assume	  anything”	  (p.	  159).	  But	  here,	  he	  is	  missing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  clarify	  for	  readers	  what	  the	  statistical	  analyses	  do	  not	  mean.	  Tabery	  comes	  to	  his	  noncommittal	  conclusion	  because	  he	  is	  giving	  the	  same	  weight	  to	  null	  results	  as	  to	  significant	  results,	  but	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  results	  are	  not	  symmetrical:	  null	  results	  do	  not	  permit	  strong	  conclusions,	  whereas	  significant	  results	  do.	  Also,	  his	  writing	  in	  this	  section	  of	  the	  book	  fails	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  claim	  of	  mechanism-­‐elucidators	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  statistical	  interaction	  in	  a	  given	  variation-­‐partitioning	  study	  of	  a	  phenotype	  does	  not	  mean	  the	  phenotype	  develops	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  mechanical	  interactions	  between	  DNA	  segments	  and	  their	  contexts	  (more	  on	  this	  in	  the	  next	  section).	  Because	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  two	  factors	  to	  interact	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  phenotype	  without	  an	  ANOVA	  revealing	  any	  statistical	  interaction	  (owing	  to	  insufficient	  variability	  across	  the	  population),	  Tabery’s	  analysis	  underestimates	  the	  role	  of	  interaction	  in	  the	  development	  of	  depression.	  	  	  	  
Two	  kinds	  of	  interaction	  By	  clarifying	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  kind	  of	  interaction	  traditionally	  explored	  by	  variation-­‐partitioners	  (i.e.,	  a	  statistical	  interaction)	  and	  mechanism-­‐elucidators	  (i.e.,	  a	  causal-­‐mechanical	  interaction),	  Tabery	  has	  provided	  a	  needed	  service	  for	  theorists	  concerned	  with	  the	  interaction	  of	  nature	  and	  nurture.	  The	  distinction	  he	  draws	  is	  very	  important,	  because	  without	  it,	  we	  are	  all	  at	  risk	  of	  misunderstanding	  any	  null	  results	  that	  might	  emerge	  from	  variation-­‐partitioning	  studies;	  specifically,	  we	  might	  misunderstand	  null	  results	  as	  meaning	  that	  the	  phenotype	  being	  studied	  actually	  emerges	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  interactions	  between	  genetic	  and	  non-­‐genetic	  factors,	  even	  though	  such	  a	  conclusion	  would	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  known	  facts	  of	  biology	  (Eisenberg,	  2004;	  Gottlieb,	  Wahlsten,	  &	  Lickliter,	  1998;	  Johnston,	  2010;	  Lewkowicz,	  2011;	  Michel	  &	  Moore,	  1995;	  Moore,	  2002,	  2013a;	  Noble,	  2006).	  However,	  despite	  Tabery’s	  valuable	  contribution	  here,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  places	  in	  his	  book	  where	  he	  seems	  to	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  distinction,	  thereby	  highlighting	  the	  dangers	  of	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approaches.	  	  Beginning	  in	  chapter	  6,	  Tabery	  considers	  the	  “empirical	  evidence	  for	  interaction.”	  Unfortunately,	  in	  this	  section	  he	  is	  exclusively	  focused	  on	  statistical	  interactions,	  as	  if	  these	  are	  the	  only	  important	  kinds	  of	  interactions.	  He	  presents	  evidence	  for	  and	  against	  the	  existence	  of	  interaction,	  but	  in	  each	  case,	  it	  is	  statistical	  interaction	  he’s	  reporting	  on,	  even	  
though	  he	  is	  not	  explicit	  about	  this;	  such	  an	  approach	  risks	  confusing	  readers	  who	  are	  still	  just	  beginning	  to	  make	  the	  conceptual	  distinction	  between	  statistical	  and	  causal-­‐mechanical	  interactions.	  	  	  For	  instance,	  on	  page	  157,	  Tabery	  gives	  his	  answer	  to	  the	  evidential	  question	  about	  interaction:	  “it’s	  a	  mixed	  bag,	  and	  we	  should	  not	  assume	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other	  whether	  interaction	  exists	  for	  any	  particular	  trait…”	  But	  this	  is	  only	  a	  valid	  conclusion	  if	  one	  is	  concerning	  oneself	  strictly	  with	  statistical	  interaction!	  Failure	  to	  explicitly	  note	  this	  fact	  implies	  that	  some	  phenotypes	  really	  emerge	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  interactions	  between	  genes	  and	  environments,	  and	  that	  is	  simply	  never	  the	  case;	  genes	  always	  interact	  with	  non-­‐genetic	  factors	  to	  produce	  phenotypes,	  whether	  our	  statistical	  analyses	  reveal	  those	  interactions	  or	  not1.	  Tabery	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  “plenty	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  against”	  interaction,	  but	  that	  really	  is	  a	  misleading	  statement,	  because	  although	  there	  is	  some	  statistical	  evidence	  against	  interaction,	  there	  is	  no	  empirical	  evidence	  whatsoever	  to	  suggest	  that	  genes	  are	  capable	  of	  influencing	  phenotypic	  outcomes	  without	  mechanically	  interacting	  with	  other	  factors	  in	  their	  environments.	  	  The	  failure	  of	  writers	  to	  distinguish	  clearly	  between	  statistical	  and	  causal-­‐mechanical	  kinds	  of	  interaction	  is	  probably	  at	  least	  partially	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  extraordinary	  persistence	  of	  the	  Nature-­‐Nurture	  debate	  (Keller,	  2010;	  Moore,	  2013b).	  We	  can	  see	  how	  problematic	  it	  is	  to	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  distinction	  by	  looking	  at	  Tabery’s	  treatment	  of	  “Brunner	  syndrome”	  in	  chapter	  7.	  There,	  he	  writes	  that	  in	  an	  infamous	  Dutch	  family	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  extremely	  aggressive	  men,	  “MAOA	  deficiency…was	  responsible	  for	  their	  low	  intelligence	  and	  proneness	  to	  aggression”	  (p.	  170).	  But	  here,	  Tabery	  has	  used	  causal-­‐mechanical	  language	  when	  the	  studies	  on	  this	  family	  were	  done	  using	  a	  correlational,	  variation-­‐partitioning	  method.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  statistical	  relationship	  between	  the	  genetic	  mutation	  associated	  with	  Brunner	  syndrome	  and	  aggressive	  behavior.	  But	  because	  no	  experimental	  studies	  were	  done	  on	  this	  family,	  we	  have	  no	  idea	  how	  the	  reduced	  MAOA	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  mutation	  brings	  about	  aggressive	  behavior.	  And	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  mechanistic	  understanding,	  it	  is	  misleading	  to	  say	  that	  the	  mutation	  is	  “responsible	  for”	  the	  behavior,	  when	  in	  fact	  the	  behavior	  would	  almost	  certainly	  be	  attenuated	  (or	  absent)	  in	  some	  contexts	  and	  amplified	  in	  others.	  Aggressive	  behavior	  is	  a	  complex	  phenotype,	  and	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  caused	  single-­‐handedly,	  in	  a	  deterministic	  way,	  by	  a	  particular	  DNA	  segment.	  After	  describing	  a	  different	  study,	  Tabery	  notes	  that	  85	  percent	  of	  participants	  who	  both	  carried	  a	  particular	  variant	  of	  the	  MAOA	  gene	  and	  had	  been	  severely	  maltreated	  were	  antisocial	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  But	  what	  of	  the	  other	  15	  percent	  of	  this	  population?	  Although	  15	  percent	  is	  a	  relatively	  small	  number,	  its	  non-­‐zero	  nature	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  more	  going	  on	  here	  than	  a	  simple	  deterministic	  relationship	  between	  low	  MAOA	  levels	  and	  aggression,	  even	  when	  controlling	  for	  one	  aspect	  of	  experience.	  So,	  to	  state	  that	  MAOA	  deficiency	  “was	  responsible	  for”	  the	  aggressive	  behavior	  in	  the	  Dutch	  family	  is	  overstating	  the	  case,	  because	  this	  deficiency	  alone	  could	  not	  have	  single-­‐handedly	  caused	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  reasons	  why	  statistical	  analyses	  might	  fail	  to	  reveal	  interactions	  that	  are	  present:	  1)	  if	  the	  correct	  factors	  are	  not	  tested,	  or	  2)	  if	  the	  correct	  factors	  are	  tested	  but	  do	  not	  vary	  sufficiently	  in	  the	  tested	  population.	  
the	  aggression.	  This	  example	  highlights	  the	  trouble	  that	  can	  arise	  when	  a	  clear	  distinction	  is	  not	  maintained	  between	  statistical	  and	  causal-­‐mechanical	  effects.	  	  
Interaction	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  When	  he	  considers	  more	  recent	  work	  on	  the	  interaction	  between	  nature	  and	  nurture,	  Tabery	  highlights	  research	  by	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  (Caspi	  et	  al.,	  2002,	  2003,	  2005)	  as	  paradigmatic	  of	  the	  modern	  approach	  of	  mechanism-­‐elucidators.	  Although	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt’s	  studies	  are	  extremely	  important,	  they	  arguably	  have	  more	  in	  common	  with	  the	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approach	  than	  Tabery	  suggests.	  Specifically,	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt’s	  studies	  were	  strictly	  correlational;	  they	  measured	  the	  status	  of	  their	  participants’	  genomes,	  environments,	  and	  behavioral	  outcomes,	  and	  looked	  for	  statistical	  relationships	  between	  them.	  In	  no	  case	  did	  they	  manipulate	  any	  of	  these	  factors	  using	  an	  experimental	  design.	  Therefore,	  although	  these	  researchers	  studied	  particular	  genes	  rather	  than	  entire	  genomes,	  their	  work	  nonetheless	  has	  quite	  a	  lot	  in	  common	  with	  the	  whole-­‐genome	  studies	  traditionally	  conducted	  by	  behavior	  geneticists.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  have	  not	  escaped	  the	  problems	  of	  traditional	  behavior	  genetics.	  Because	  their	  studies	  were	  still	  merely	  correlational,	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  elucidate	  any	  mechanisms,	  but	  instead	  sought	  to	  explore	  how	  various	  genetic	  and	  environmental	  factors	  were	  associated	  with	  behavioral	  outcomes.	  Tabery	  has	  argued	  that	  individual	  variation-­‐partitioning	  and	  mechanism-­‐elucidating	  studies	  are	  “all	  correlational”	  (p.	  128,	  emphasis	  in	  original),	  and	  that’s	  true	  in	  a	  Humean	  sense,	  but	  there	  is	  still	  an	  important	  distinction—a	  crucial	  distinction,	  really—to	  be	  made	  between	  studies	  that	  involve	  a	  manipulation	  and	  studies	  that	  merely	  measure:	  the	  former	  can	  reveal	  practical	  interventions	  that	  can	  influence	  outcomes,	  whereas	  the	  latter	  cannot.	  The	  best	  a	  non-­‐experimental	  study	  can	  do	  is	  permit	  some	  predictions.	  Tabery	  thinks	  that	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt’s	  “appeals	  to	  experimental	  research”	  (p.	  93)	  identify	  them	  as	  mechanism-­‐elucidators,	  and	  those	  appeals	  do	  suggest	  that	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  are	  not	  strict	  variation-­‐partitioners.	  But	  the	  research	  they	  are	  best	  known	  for	  is	  not	  experimental,	  so	  when	  Tabery	  writes	  “Moffitt	  and	  Caspi’s	  studies	  of	  gene-­‐environment	  interaction	  are	  the	  modern-­‐day	  exemplar	  of	  the	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approach	  to	  understanding	  interaction”	  (p.	  93),	  I	  have	  to	  disagree.	  A	  much	  better	  candidate	  for	  a	  modern	  day	  exemplar	  of	  the	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approach	  is	  the	  research	  undertaken	  by	  Michael	  Meaney	  and	  Moshe	  Szyf,	  who	  have	  been	  experimentally	  studying	  the	  molecular	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  early-­‐life	  experiences	  cause	  different	  behaviors	  in	  adulthood	  (Meaney,	  2001,	  2010;	  Szyf	  &	  Bick,	  2013;	  see	  also	  Moore,	  2015).	  On	  a	  hypothetical	  continuum	  between	  variation-­‐partitioning	  and	  mechanism-­‐elucidation,	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  would	  probably	  be	  relatively	  far	  from	  the	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  pole	  staked	  out	  by	  Hogben	  and	  Lewontin	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  Whereas	  I	  doubt	  that	  Hogben	  or	  Lewontin	  would	  have	  ever	  acceded	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  phenotype	  development	  might	  not	  involve	  an	  interaction—because	  a	  “mechanism”	  for	  biologists	  can	  fairly	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  system	  of	  causally	  interacting	  parts—had	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  not	  detected	  a	  statistically	  significant	  interaction	  in	  their	  initial	  ANOVAs,	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  they	  would	  have	  abandoned	  their	  search.	  	  Tabery’s	  treatment	  of	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt’s	  work	  offers	  a	  particularly	  good	  opportunity	  to	  examine	  the	  risks	  that	  characterize	  variation-­‐partitioning	  studies.	  Tabery,	  like	  some	  other	  
theorists,	  seems	  to	  take	  the	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  work	  to	  be	  an	  example	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  interactionist	  thinking	  promoted	  by	  developmental	  systems	  theorists	  (such	  as	  Lickliter,	  2013;	  Moore,	  2002,	  2015;	  Oyama,	  Griffiths,	  &	  Gray,	  2001;	  Spencer	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Thelen	  &	  Smith,	  1994).	  However,	  developmental	  systems	  theorists	  recognize	  that	  phenotypes	  always	  emerge	  from	  mechanical	  interactions	  between	  genes	  and	  their	  contexts,	  and	  a	  close	  look	  at	  Tabery’s	  writing	  (and	  the	  writing	  of	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt)	  reveals	  a	  willingness	  to	  accept	  a	  form	  of	  genetic	  determinism	  that	  is	  decidedly	  at	  odds	  with	  a	  developmental	  perspective.	  	  For	  example,	  on	  page	  140,	  Tabery	  offers	  a	  portrait	  built	  around	  how	  variations	  in	  the	  serotonin	  transporter	  gene	  (5-­‐HTTLPR)	  are	  associated	  with	  variations	  in	  neuroticism.	  His	  portrait	  details	  how	  differences	  in	  this	  DNA	  segment	  lead	  to	  differences	  at	  higher	  levels	  of	  analysis,	  from	  the	  molecular	  level	  to	  the	  cellular	  level	  to	  the	  organ	  level,	  and	  thereby	  results	  in	  individuals	  characterized	  as	  having—or	  not	  having—the	  “stable	  trait	  of	  negative	  affectivity	  [or	  neuroticism].”	  Tabery’s	  goal	  here	  is	  to	  elaborate	  on	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt’s	  story	  about	  how	  people	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  negative	  affectivity	  may	  or	  may	  not	  develop	  major	  
depression,	  depending	  on	  the	  experiences	  they	  have	  as	  they	  develop;	  as	  both	  Tabery	  and	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  tell	  it,	  this	  looks	  like	  a	  story	  about	  interaction,	  because	  different	  outcomes	  depend	  on	  both	  different	  5-­‐HTTLPR	  genes	  and	  on	  different	  life	  events.	  But	  Tabery’s	  depiction	  of	  the	  mechanism	  underlying	  neuroticism	  itself	  shows	  no	  such	  subtlety;	  in	  that	  portrait,	  a	  genetic	  difference	  leads	  directly	  to	  a	  difference	  in	  neuroticism.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  am	  not	  aware	  of	  any	  data	  to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  neuroticism	  is	  genetically	  determined,	  that	  is,	  insensitive	  to	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  development	  takes	  place.	  Instead,	  neuroticism—like	  the	  major	  depressions	  that	  depend	  on	  it—must	  develop	  in	  some	  context,	  and	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  believe	  the	  development	  of	  this	  phenotype	  depends	  on	  more	  than	  just	  the	  5-­‐HTTLPR	  gene.	  So,	  Tabery’s	  example	  here	  illustrates	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  variation-­‐partitioning;	  unless	  we	  are	  always	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  mechanism-­‐elucidation,	  we	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  unwittingly	  starting	  to	  think	  like	  a	  genetic	  determinist.	  This	  is	  risky,	  because	  genetic	  determinism	  black-­‐boxes	  development	  and	  effectively	  encourages	  researchers	  to	  give	  up	  the	  search	  for	  answers	  about	  how	  to	  affect	  phenotypic	  outcomes	  by	  intervening	  in	  development	  (Johnston,	  1987;	  Lehrman,	  1953;	  Lickliter	  &	  Berry,	  1990;	  Moore,	  2009).	  	  We	  can	  see	  this	  problem	  in	  relief	  a	  few	  pages	  later.	  There,	  Tabery	  writes	  that	  “Moffitt	  and	  Caspi	  combined	  …	  research	  on	  a	  genetic	  actual	  difference	  maker	  with	  …	  research	  on	  an	  environmental	  actual	  difference	  maker	  and	  ultimately	  proposed	  a	  ‘unifying	  mechanism’	  that	  pulled	  the	  various	  threads	  together—a	  genetic	  actual	  difference	  maker	  that	  leads	  to	  actual	  differences	  in	  neuroticism	  regardless	  of	  exposure	  to	  stressful	  life	  events,	  but	  only	  actual	  differences	  in	  depression	  when	  exposed	  to	  actual	  differences	  in	  stressful	  life	  events”	  (p.	  144,	  emphasis	  added).	  By	  failing	  to	  identify	  what	  sorts	  of	  non-­‐genetic	  events	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  neuroticism	  itself,	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  have	  still	  failed	  to	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  development	  of	  depression.	  What	  they	  have	  done—now	  with	  Tabery’s	  help—is	  move	  genetic	  determinism	  back	  one	  level:	  now,	  rather	  than	  seeing	  depression	  itself	  as	  genetically	  determined,	  it	  is	  merely	  neuroticism	  that	  is	  characterized	  as	  genetically	  determined,	  with	  depression	  arising	  from	  a	  gene	  ×	  environment	  interaction.	  This	  example	  is	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  thinking	  about	  genes	  as	  factors	  
that	  are	  able	  to	  single-­‐handedly	  determine	  phenotypes.	  When	  one	  loses	  sight	  of	  a	  developmental	  perspective	  and	  therefore	  sees	  a	  phenotype	  like	  negative	  affectivity	  as	  inevitable	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  certain	  genotype,	  one	  can	  wind	  up	  looking	  like	  an	  interactionist	  (in	  this	  case,	  with	  respect	  to	  depression)	  while	  nonetheless	  implying	  that	  genes	  can	  deterministically	  cause	  a	  neurotic	  phenotype	  independently	  of	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  development	  takes	  place.	  	  Because	  there	  have	  been	  more	  than	  one	  large	  meta-­‐analysis	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  interaction	  is	  not	  replicable	  (Munafò,	  Durrant,	  Lewis,	  &	  Flint,	  2009;	  Risch	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  draw	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  stress	  does	  not	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  major	  depression.	  However,	  as	  Tabery	  helpfully	  points	  out,	  these	  results	  might	  merely	  “speak	  to	  a	  potential	  for	  refining	  the	  environmental	  variable”	  (p.	  162).	  Of	  course,	  this	  is	  correct;	  “stress	  exposure”	  might	  be	  a	  variable	  that	  is	  simply	  too	  non-­‐specific	  to	  allow	  for	  reasonably	  accurate	  predictions	  of	  depression.	  So	  in	  the	  end,	  Tabery	  saves	  the	  day	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  “we’re	  talking	  about	  the	  potential	  discovery	  of	  a	  complicated	  relationship—between	  a	  gene	  that	  is	  still	  being	  understood	  at	  the	  molecular	  level,	  an	  environment	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  quantify,	  and	  a	  complex	  psychiatric	  disorder”	  (p.	  163).	  But	  he	  made	  it	  harder	  than	  necessary	  on	  himself	  by	  initially	  taking	  some	  null	  ANOVA	  results	  more	  seriously	  than	  was	  warranted.	  	  	  Because	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  approach	  between	  the	  Caspi-­‐Moffitt	  team	  and	  both	  Hogben	  and	  Lewontin,	  I	  had	  a	  difficult	  time	  believing	  Tabery’s	  claim	  that	  the	  21st	  century	  controversy	  over	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt’s	  findings	  mirrors	  the	  earlier	  debates	  between	  Fisher	  and	  Hogben	  or	  between	  Jensen	  and	  Lewontin.	  Nonetheless,	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt’s	  critics	  do	  seem	  to	  hearken	  back	  to	  Fisher	  when	  they	  reject	  gene-­‐environment	  interactions	  as	  unlikely	  
in	  general	  (p.	  89).	  And	  notwithstanding	  my	  concerns	  about	  Caspi	  and	  Moffitt	  being	  treated	  as	  true	  mechanism-­‐elucidators,	  I	  do	  think	  Tabery	  has	  written	  an	  impressive	  treatment	  of	  their	  findings	  and	  the	  ensuing	  controversy.	  	  	  
Envisioning	  the	  future	  The	  final	  two	  chapters	  of	  Beyond	  versus	  use	  the	  tools	  of	  the	  bioethicist	  to	  consider	  the	  significance	  of	  some	  recent	  findings	  regarding	  interaction	  between	  nature	  and	  nurture.	  Tabery	  is	  in	  top	  form	  in	  these	  chapters,	  conveying	  to	  readers	  the	  meaning	  of	  these	  findings,	  warning	  us	  of	  ways	  they	  can	  be	  misinterpreted,	  and	  alerting	  us	  to	  issues	  that	  deserve	  thought	  at	  this	  juncture.	  He	  makes	  a	  compelling	  argument	  in	  chapter	  7	  for	  not	  spending	  public	  funds	  to	  screen	  children	  for	  low	  MAOA	  and	  instead	  using	  any	  money	  available	  for	  such	  projects	  to	  extend	  to	  children	  in	  general	  an	  intervention	  to	  reduce	  maltreatment	  in	  childhood.	  Likewise,	  his	  points	  here	  about	  the	  need	  to	  remain	  aware	  of	  the	  power	  of	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecies	  are	  worth	  taking	  seriously,	  because	  knowing	  what	  is	  in	  a	  child’s	  genome—and	  having	  a	  partial	  understanding	  of	  what	  that	  might	  mean—would	  almost	  certainly	  influence	  people’s	  thoughts	  and	  behaviors	  in	  ways	  that	  could	  negatively	  affect	  the	  child.	  	  In	  chapter	  8,	  Tabery	  focuses	  on	  the	  potential	  value	  of	  providing	  parents	  with	  information	  about	  their	  children’s	  genomes	  when	  that	  information	  could	  inform	  decisions	  that	  parents	  
are	  going	  to	  make	  whether	  they	  have	  the	  information	  or	  not.	  Parents	  make	  all	  sorts	  of	  
decisions	  about	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  their	  children	  develop,	  so	  Tabery	  is	  right	  that	  genetic	  information	  could	  potentially	  help	  them	  make	  more	  informed	  decisions.	  But	  he	  is	  also	  right	  that	  this	  approach	  is	  not	  without	  risks,	  as	  there	  are	  undeniable	  downsides	  to	  empowering	  parents,	  such	  as	  the	  increased	  responsibility	  that	  empowerment	  thrusts	  upon	  them.	  Regardless,	  Tabery	  has	  done	  all	  of	  us	  a	  favor	  by	  beginning	  to	  consider	  the	  ethical	  implications	  of	  this	  work	  today,	  before	  the	  $1,000-­‐genome	  is	  actually	  available	  to	  us.	  	  Ultimately,	  I	  share	  Tabery’s	  concern	  that	  genetic	  determinism	  might	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  “interactionist	  determinism,”	  wherein	  a	  child	  with	  a	  particular	  genome	  who	  has	  been	  subjected	  to	  certain	  kinds	  of	  experiences	  comes	  to	  see	  himself	  or	  herself	  as	  inevitably	  possessed	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  mental	  or	  behavioral	  status.	  The	  fact	  is,	  we	  still	  understand	  very	  little	  about	  the	  development	  of	  characteristics	  like	  aggression	  or	  depression,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  a	  blunder	  to	  convey	  to	  the	  general	  public	  a	  mistaken	  impression	  that	  we	  know	  more	  than	  we	  do.	  The	  fact	  is,	  developmental	  outcomes	  remain	  largely	  unpredictable,	  to	  date.	  	  As	  I	  see	  it,	  the	  most	  important	  take-­‐away	  message	  from	  Beyond	  versus	  is	  a	  message	  this	  is	  not	  new,	  but	  that	  nonetheless	  bears	  repeating:	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  phenotypes	  reflect	  the	  
mechanical	  interaction	  of	  genetic	  and	  non-­‐genetic	  factors,	  the	  idea	  that	  someone	  is	  “genetically	  predisposed”	  to	  a	  particular	  outcome	  is	  simplistic.	  Tabery	  does	  an	  outstanding	  job	  of	  explaining	  why	  this	  phrase	  is	  inappropriate	  in	  cases	  of	  gene	  ×	  environment	  interac-­‐tion	  that	  involve	  a	  “change	  in	  rank,”	  but	  his	  argument	  is	  weaker	  than	  it	  needs	  to	  be,	  since	  he	  condones	  the	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  in	  some	  cases	  (e.g.,	  when	  an	  interaction	  involves	  only	  a	  “change	  in	  scale”).	  Biologists	  have	  understood	  for	  decades	  that	  there	  really	  are	  never	  any	  cases	  where	  we	  can	  be	  sure	  an	  interaction	  does	  not	  involve	  a	  change	  in	  rank,	  because	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  change	  in	  rank	  across	  a	  studied	  range	  of	  environments,	  a	  change	  in	  rank	  could	  still	  be	  discovered	  in	  some	  other	  range	  of	  environments;	  an	  interaction	  that	  involves	  merely	  a	  change	  of	  scale	  could	  involve	  a	  change	  of	  rank	  if	  the	  environments	  studied	  fell	  in	  a	  different	  range	  on	  the	  continuum.	  	  To	  clarify	  this	  point,	  consider	  Tabery’s	  definition	  of	  “a	  genetic	  predisposition”:	  “the	  presence	  of	  a	  genetic	  difference	  between	  various	  groups	  consistently	  increases	  the	  probability	  of	  individuals	  from	  one	  group,	  in	  comparison	  to	  individuals	  from	  the	  other	  group(s),	  developing	  a	  particular	  trait	  regardless	  of	  the	  measured	  environmental	  condition”	  (p.	  177,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  This	  definition	  works,	  but	  it	  contains	  a	  problem	  that	  could	  mislead	  readers.	  Tabery’s	  reference	  is	  to	  a	  measured	  environmental	  condition,	  but	  the	  fact	  is	  that	  it	  is	  never	  possible	  to	  measure	  all	  environmental	  conditions.	  So,	  we	  can	  picture	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  individuals	  in	  one	  study	  group	  are	  consistently	  more	  likely	  than	  the	  individuals	  in	  other	  groups	  to	  develop	  a	  trait	  in	  a	  hundred	  different	  environments.	  But	  there	  is	  always	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  test	  conducted	  in	  the	  101st	  environment	  would	  reveal	  that	  individuals	  in	  the	  first	  group	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  than	  individuals	  in	  other	  groups	  to	  develop	  the	  trait	  when	  reared	  in	  that	  environment.	  So	  as	  a	  practical	  matter,	  it	  is	  really	  never	  appropriate	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  genetic	  predisposition	  without	  also	  specifying	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  development	  will	  unfold.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  concept	  of	  “genetic	  predisposition”	  (as	  we	  intuitively	  think	  about	  it,	  at	  least)	  is	  suspect;	  because	  phenotypes	  always	  develop	  via	  the	  collaborative	  actions	  of	  genes	  and	  their	  contexts,	  and	  because	  it	  is	  
impossible	  to	  test	  genomes	  in	  all	  possible	  contexts,	  we	  can	  never	  be	  sure	  we	  have	  a	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  what	  a	  given	  genome	  is	  (or	  is	  not)	  capable	  of	  producing.	  The	  geneticist	  Theodosius	  Dobzhansky	  concluded	  in	  the	  1950s	  that	  knowing	  the	  limits	  that	  could	  be	  expected	  of	  a	  particular	  genotype	  would	  require	  tests	  of	  that	  genotype	  in	  all	  possible	  environments,	  which	  is	  obviously	  an	  impossible	  task.	  To	  drive	  home	  his	  argument,	  Dobzhansky	  pointed	  out	  that	  “the	  existing	  variety	  of	  environments	  is	  immense,	  and	  new	  environments	  are	  constantly	  produced.	  Invention	  of	  a	  new	  drug,	  a	  new	  diet,	  a	  new	  type	  of	  housing,	  a	  new	  educational	  system,	  a	  new	  political	  regime	  introduces	  new	  environments”	  (p.	  75).	  And	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  situation,	  we	  can	  never	  state	  with	  confidence	  that	  a	  given	  genetic	  state	  predisposes	  an	  individual	  to	  a	  particular	  outcome	  in	  general;	  only	  by	  having	  information	  about	  both	  an	  organism’s	  genes	  and	  environment	  can	  we	  make	  strong	  claims	  about	  predispositions.	  Put	  into	  Tabery’s	  language	  about	  changes	  in	  rank	  versus	  changes	  in	  scale,	  any	  time	  we	  discover	  an	  interaction	  as	  a	  change	  in	  scale,	  the	  addition	  of	  another	  environment	  to	  be	  tested	  could	  reveal	  a	  previously-­‐unseen	  change	  in	  rank;	  therefore,	  risk	  is	  almost	  always	  best	  understood	  as	  dependent	  on	  both	  genetic	  and	  environmental	  variables.	  	  Notwithstanding	  my	  criticisms,	  Tabery’s	  book	  is	  a	  welcome	  addition	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  interaction	  of	  nature	  and	  nurture.	  In	  fact,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  his	  presentation	  of	  Hogben’s	  intellectual	  assault	  on	  eugenics	  should	  be	  required	  reading	  for	  all	  scientists,	  because	  it	  is	  so	  generally	  applicable	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  interpreting	  data,	  and	  it	  makes	  it	  clear	  how	  Fisher’s	  
statistical	  interaction	  differs	  from	  the	  kinds	  of	  causal-­‐mechanical	  interactions	  that	  were	  of	  concern	  to	  Hogben	  (Griffiths	  &	  Tabery,	  2008).	  This	  is	  an	  extremely	  important	  message,	  as	  it	  bears	  on	  the	  question	  of	  what	  sort	  of	  information	  is	  of	  practical	  value.	  Fisher	  dismissed	  Hogben’s	  concerns	  as	  “academic,”	  because	  Hogben	  was	  interested	  in	  what	  might	  be	  possible;	  in	  contrast,	  Fisher	  considered	  his	  own	  work	  to	  be	  “practical,”	  because	  he	  remained	  focused	  on	  partitioning	  variation	  in	  “real”	  populations	  of	  organisms	  like	  potato	  plants.	  Somewhat	  paradoxically,	  to	  understand	  “practical”	  problems	  facing	  farmers,	  Fisher-­‐the-­‐statistician	  wound	  up	  resorting	  to	  abstractions;	  in	  contrast,	  Hogben	  used	  real	  observations	  to	  make	  his	  points	  about	  what	  would	  be	  theoretically	  possible.	  Of	  course,	  Fisher	  used	  the	  word	  “practical”	  as	  meaning	  “relating	  to	  real	  life	  as	  we	  know	  it,”	  but	  accepting	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  only	  practical	  in	  one	  sense.	  In	  contrast,	  to	  a	  developmentalist,	  what	  is	  “practical”	  is	  a	  tool	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  intervene	  in	  a	  way	  that	  can	  influence	  outcomes,	  thereby	  changing	  the	  status	  quo.	  As	  I	  see	  it,	  there	  can	  be	  little	  of	  more	  practical	  importance	  than	  using	  a	  mechanism-­‐elucidation	  approach	  to	  discover	  ways	  to	  improve	  the	  human	  condition.	  	  Ultimately,	  I	  agree	  with	  Hogben	  and	  Lewontin,	  and	  I	  believe	  Tabery	  does	  as	  well:	  the	  variation-­‐partitioning	  approach	  is	  dangerous	  only	  if	  the	  conclusions	  generated	  by	  this	  approach	  are	  “treated	  as	  an	  end	  point,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  to	  other	  more	  interventionist	  experiments	  designed	  to	  investigate	  the	  developmental	  relationship	  between	  nature	  and	  nurture”	  (Tabery,	  2014,	  p.	  69).	  It	  is	  via	  the	  analysis	  of	  development	  that	  behavioral	  scientists	  and	  life	  scientists	  can	  most	  effectively	  make	  positive	  contributions	  to	  people’s	  lives.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
References	  Bateson,	  P.	  (2002).	  The	  corpse	  of	  a	  wearisome	  debate:	  Review	  of	  Steven	  Pinker’s	  The	  blank	  
slate:	  The	  modern	  denial	  of	  human	  nature.	  Science,	  297,	  2212	  –	  2213.	  Blumberg,	  M.	  S.	  (2005).	  Basic	  instinct:	  The	  genesis	  of	  behavior.	  New	  York:	  Thunder’s	  Mouth	  Press.	  Caspi,	  A.,	  McClay,	  J.,	  Moffitt,	  T.	  E.,	  Mill,	  J.,	  Martin,	  J.,	  Craig,	  I.	  W.,	  .	  .	  .	  Poulton,	  R.	  (2002).	  Role	  of	  genotype	  in	  the	  cycle	  of	  violence	  in	  maltreated	  children.	  Science,	  297,	  851	  –	  854.	  Caspi,	  A.,	  Moffitt,	  T.	  E.,	  Cannon,	  M.,	  McClay,	  J.,	  Murray,	  R.,	  Harrington,	  H.,	  .	  .	  .	  Craig,	  I.	  W.	  (2005).	  Moderation	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  adolescent-­‐onset	  cannabis	  use	  on	  adult	  psychosis	  by	  a	  functional	  polymorphism	  in	  the	  catechol-­‐O-­‐methyltransferase	  gene:	  Longitudinal	  evidence	  of	  a	  gene	  ×	  environment	  interaction.	  Biological	  Psychiatry,	  57,	  1117	  –	  1127.	  	  Caspi,	  A.,	  Sugden,	  K.,	  Moffitt,	  T.	  E.,	  Taylor,	  A.,	  Craig,	  I.W.,	  Harrington,	  H.,	  .	  .	  .	  Poulton,	  R.	  (2003).	  Influence	  of	  life	  stress	  on	  depression:	  Moderation	  by	  a	  polymorphism	  in	  the	  5-­‐HTT	  gene.	  Science,	  301,	  386	  –	  389.	  Dobzhansky,	  T.	  (1955).	  	  Evolution,	  genetics,	  and	  man.	  	  New	  York:	  Wiley.	  
Eisenberg, L. (2004). Social psychiatry and the human genome: Contextualising heritability. 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 184, 101–103. Gottlieb,	  G.	  (1997).	  Synthesizing	  nature-­‐nurture:	  Prenatal	  roots	  of	  instinctive	  behavior.	  Mahwah,	  NJ:	  Lawrence	  Erlbaum	  Associates.	  
Gottlieb, G., Wahlsten, D., & Lickliter, R. (1998). The significance of biology for human 
development: A developmental psychobiological systems view. In W. Damon (Series 
Ed.) & R. M. Lerner (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 1. Theoretical 
models of human development (5th ed., pp. 233–234). New York: Wiley. Griffiths,	  P.	  E.,	  &	  Tabery,	  J.	  (2008).	  Behavioral	  genetics	  and	  development:	  Historical	  and	  conceptual	  causes	  of	  controversy.	  New	  Ideas	  in	  Psychology,	  26,	  332	  –	  352.	  
Hariri, A. R., Goldberg, T. E., Mattay, V. S., Kolachana, B. S., Callicott, J. H., Egan, M. F., & 
Weinberger, D. R. (2003). Brain-derived neurotrophic factor val66met polymorphism 
affects human memory-related hippocampal activity and predicts memory performance. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 23, 6690 – 6694. 
Johnston, T. D. (1987). The persistence of dichotomies in the study of behavioral development. 
Developmental Review, 7, 149–182. 
Johnston, T. D. (2010). Developmental systems theory. In M. S. Blumberg, J. H. Freeman, & S. 
R. Robinson (Eds.), Oxford handbook of developmental behavioral neuroscience (pp. 12–
29). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Keller, E. F. (2010). The mirage of a space between nature and nurture. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Lehrman, D. S. (1953). A critique of Konrad Lorenz’s theory of instinctive behavior. Quarterly 
Review of Biology, 28, 337–363. 
Lewkowicz, D. J. (2011). The biological implausibility of the nature–nurture dichotomy and 
what it means for the study of infancy. Infancy, 16, 331–367. 
Lickliter, R. (2013). Biological development: Theoretical approaches, techniques, and key 
findings. In P. D. Zelazo (Ed.), Oxford handbook of developmental psychology (pp. 65 – 
90). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lickliter, R., & Berry, T. D. (1990). The phyologeny fallacy: Developmental psychology’s 
misapplication of evolutionary theory. Developmental Review, 10, 348–364. Meaney,	  M.	  J.	  (2001).	  Maternal	  care,	  gene	  expression,	  and	  the	  transmission	  of	  individual	  differences	  in	  stress	  reactivity	  across	  generations.	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Neuroscience,	  
24,	  1161	  –	  1192.	  Meaney,	  M.	  J.	  (2010).	  Epigenetics	  and	  the	  biological	  definition	  of	  gene	  ×	  environment	  interactions.	  Child	  Development,	  81,	  41	  –	  79.	  	  
Michel, G. F., & Moore, C. L. (1995). Developmental psychobiology: An interdisciplinary 
science. Cambridge, MA: MIT. 
Mizuno, M., Yamada, K., Olariu, A., Nawa, H., & Nabeshima, T. (2000). Involvement of brain-
derived neurotrophic factor in spatial memory formation and maintenance in radial arm 
maze test in rats. Journal of Neuroscience, 20, 7116 – 7121. Moore,	  D.	  S.	  (2002).	  The	  dependent	  gene:	  The	  fallacy	  of	  “nature	  vs.	  nurture.”	  	  New	  York:	  Times	  Books/Henry	  Holt	  &	  Co.	  Moore,	  D.	  S.	  (2006).	  A	  very	  little	  bit	  of	  knowledge:	  Re-­‐evaluating	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  heritability	  of	  IQ.	  Human	  Development,	  49,	  347	  –	  353.	  	  Moore,	  D.	  S.	  (2009).	  Probing	  predispositions:	  The	  pragmatism	  of	  a	  process	  perspective.	  
Child	  Development	  Perspectives,	  3,	  91–93.	  Moore,	  D.	  S.	  (2013a).	  Behavioral	  genetics,	  genetics,	  &	  epigenetics.	  In	  P.	  D.	  Zelazo	  (Ed.),	  
Oxford	  handbook	  of	  developmental	  psychology	  (pp.	  91	  –	  128).	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Moore,	  D.	  S.	  (2013b).	  Current	  thinking	  about	  nature	  and	  nurture.	  In	  K.	  Kampourakis	  (Ed.),	  
The	  philosophy	  of	  biology:	  A	  companion	  for	  educators	  (pp.	  629	  –	  652).	  	  New	  York:	  Springer.	  Moore,	  D.	  S.	  (2015).	  The	  developing	  genome:	  An	  introduction	  to	  behavioral	  epigenetics.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Munafò, M. R., Durrant, C., Lewis, G., & Flint, J. (2009). Gene × environment interactions at the 
serotonin transporter locus. Biological Psychiatry, 65, 211–219. 
Noble, D. (2006). The music of life: Biology beyond genes. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Oyama, S., Griffiths, P. E., & Gray, R. D. (2001). Cycles of contingency: Developmental systems 
and evolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pinker,	  S.	  (2002).	  The	  blank	  slate:	  The	  modern	  denial	  of	  human	  nature.	  New	  York:	  Viking.	  Plomin,	  R.,	  &	  Deary,	  I.	  J.	  (2015).	  Genetics	  and	  intelligence	  differences:	  Five	  special	  findings.	  
Molecular	  Psychiatry,	  20,	  98	  –	  108.	  Polderman,	  T.	  J.	  C.,	  Benyamin,	  B.,	  de	  Leeuw,	  C.	  A.,	  Sullivan,	  P.	  F.,	  van	  Bochoven,	  A.,	  Visscher,	  P.	  M.,	  &	  Posthuma,	  D.	  (2015).	  Meta-­‐analysis	  of	  the	  heritability	  of	  human	  traits	  based	  on	  fifty	  years	  of	  twin	  studies.	  Nature	  Genetics,	  47,	  702	  –	  709.	  Risch,	  N.,	  Herrell,	  R.,	  Lehner,	  T.,	  Liang,	  K.,	  Eaves,	  L.,	  Hoh,	  J.,	  .	  .	  .	  Merikangas,	  K.	  R.	  (2009).	  Interaction	  between	  the	  serotonin	  transporter	  gene	  (5–HTTLPR),	  stressful	  life	  events,	  and	  risk	  of	  depression:	  A	  meta-­‐analysis.	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  
Association,	  301,	  2462–2471.	  Spencer,	  J.	  P.,	  Blumberg,	  M.	  S.,	  McMurray,	  B.,	  Robinson,	  S.	  R.,	  Samuelson,	  L.	  K.,	  &	  Tomblin,	  J.	  B.	  (2009).	  Short	  arms	  and	  talking	  eggs:	  Why	  we	  should	  no	  longer	  abide	  the	  nativist-­‐empiricist	  debate.	  Child	  Development	  Perspectives,	  3,	  79–87.	  
Szyf,	  M.,	  &	  Bick,	  J.	  (2013).	  DNA	  methylation:	  A	  mechanism	  for	  embedding	  early	  life	  experiences	  in	  the	  genome.	  Child	  Development,	  84,	  49	  –	  57.	  	  Tabery,	  J.	  (2014).	  Beyond	  versus:	  The	  struggle	  to	  understand	  the	  interaction	  and	  nature	  and	  
nurture.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  Thelen,	  E.,	  &	  Smith,	  L.	  B.	  (1994).	  A	  dynamic	  systems	  approach	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
cognition	  and	  action.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  Waters,	  C.	  K.	  (2007).	  Causes	  that	  make	  a	  difference.	  	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  104,	  551	  –	  579.	  Weaver,	  I.	  C.	  G.	  (2007).	  Epigenetic	  programming	  by	  maternal	  behavior	  and	  pharmacological	  intervention:	  Nature	  versus	  nurture:	  Let’s	  call	  the	  whole	  thing	  off.	  
Epigenetics,	  2,	  22	  –	  28.	  	  
